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Economists have long been interested in the extent to which economic resources affect 
decisions to marry and divorce.  For married couples, an increase in resources can either 
provide a stabilization effect or, alternatively, can enable divorce by allowing the couple 
to overcome costs associated with divorce.  Similarly, while economic theory predicts 
that  an  increase  in  income  makes  an  unmarried  person  more  attractive  to  potential 
marriage partners, it may also make single life more attractive.  However, answering 
these questions empirically has been difficult due to a lack of exogenous income shocks.  
We  overcome  this  problem  by  exploiting  the  randomness  of  the  Florida  Lottery  and 
comparing recipients of large prizes to those of small prizes.  Results indicate that while 
positive income shocks of $25,000 to $50,000 do not cause statistically significant or 
economically meaningful changes in divorce rates, single women are less likely to marry 
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1.  Introduction 
Economists and other social scientists have devoted significant effort at 
determining the relationship between economic resources and marital decisions.  Interest 
began with work by Gary Becker (1981) on how income affects an individual’s 
incentives to marry or divorce.  More recently, researchers and policymakers have tried 
to determine whether income supports or tax credits for low-income households cause 
individuals to divorce or fail to marry, which many policymakers would regard as an 
unintended consequence.   
There are several reasons why positive income shocks could affect marital 
decisions.  For married couples, more generous cash transfers may have a stabilization 
effect and relax financial constraints and arguments that lead to divorce.  Indeed, the 
income shocks received by individuals in this study—$25,000  to $50,000—are 
sufficiently large to pay off the majority of the unsecured debt ($49,000) owed by the 
those who had earlier filed for bankruptcy (Hankins et al, 2009).   
On the other hand, increased resources may enable unhappy couples to incur the 
costs associated with divorce.
1  Schramm (2006) estimates that legal fees incurred during 
divorce average $7,000 while the additional housing cost averages just over $4,000 per 
year.
2  The short-term costs associated with divorce may be especially important to the 
extent that couples are liquidity-constrained or behave as such due to risk-aversion.  
                                                 
1 This theory has been popularized in the press.  In an article entitled “Buy Low, Divorce High” published 
in the New York Times on August 12, 2007, one divorcee and beneficiary of the appreciation in the housing 
market is quoted as stating “Money is freedom…We made enough money to be able to get divorced and 
support two households.”   
2 Both the legal and housing cost estimates are for married couples with children; we were unable to 
document any other estimates of the average legal and housing costs associated with divorce.  The estimate 
from Schramm (2006) on housing costs comes from Census reports on average housing costs reported for 
unmarried individuals.  Consequently, it may understate the additional cost in the first year since moving to 
less expensive housing takes time and since the estimate ignores the actual moving costs.    
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Indeed, evidence consistent with widespread liquidity-constraints is reported by Laibson 
et al. (2001), who reports that at least 63 percent of U.S. households pay interest on credit 
card debt every month.  In addition, other studies have shown how individuals do not 
smooth consumption as predicted by the permanent income hypothesis (Shapiro, 2005; 
Stephens, 2003).  Finally, even the seemingly long-term costs of divorce such as the 
increased cost of supporting two households are more temporary than one might expect; 
Kreider (2006) reports that 50 percent of individuals who divorce remarry within 5 years, 
and more likely cohabit.      
The theoretical effect of positive income shocks on marriage rates is also 
ambiguous.  While simple economic models of marriage predict that an increase in 
resources will make single individuals more attractive as marriage partners, it also makes 
single life more attractive (Burstein, 2007; Moffitt, 1992).  In addition, more resources 
may facilitate marriage due to sociocultural ideals for weddings or married life that 
require greater assets (Edin, 2000).   
Determining the extent to which marriage and divorce are normal goods is 
difficult due to a lack of exogenous pure income shocks.  Perhaps the most closely related 
research is that which examines the impact of men’s or women’s earnings on labor force 
participation (e.g., Hoffman and Duncan, 1995; Weiss and Willis, 1997).  However, by 
design these estimates pick up the effect of income as well as reduced returns to 
specialization.  Furthermore, as Johnson and Skinner (1986) point out, it is hard to 
determine if, for example, women work more hours in response to a higher expected 
probability of divorce or if women are more likely to divorce because they earn higher 
incomes.  Similarly, it is difficult to believe that men in typical data sets who later receive  
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positive income shocks did so randomly rather than because of personal qualities such as 
loyalty or interpersonal skills.  This is problematic given that these characteristics could 
themselves yield stronger marriages but are not observed by the econometrician.  Finally, 
while perhaps the most promising variation in income came from the randomization of 
income guarantees in the Negative Income Tax experiments, methodological problems 
and the complexity of the experiments have made it difficult to determine what aspect of 
the experiments, if any, affected marital decision-making (e.g., Groenveld et al, 1980; 
Cain and Wissoker, 1990).   
There is also a literature that examines the impact of income-changing life events 
on marital decisions.  Bitler et al. (2004) and Hu (2003) found that reducing welfare 
benefits increases the likelihood of divorce, though given the nature of the policy it is 
impossible to distinguish the effect of the negative income shock from that of the 
increased work requirement.  In addition, researchers have examined how job 
displacement and disability impact marital stability.  However, in examining those effects 
Charles and Stephens (2004) argue that the information conveyed by the type of job 
displacement itself affects the likelihood of divorce.  This highlights the difficulty in 
determining the effect of income per se on marital stability in the absence of truly 
exogenous shocks to income.   
In order to distinguish the effect of pure income shocks on marriage and divorce 
from other confounding factors, we exploit the random variation in the magnitude of cash 
prizes won in state lotteries.  In exploiting exogenous variation in income due to lottery 
winnings, our identification strategy is similar to that used by Imbens et al. (2001) and 
Lindahl (2005) to address the effect of income shocks on labor supply and consumption  
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and on health and mortality, respectively.  To implement our research design, we link 
data on lottery winners from Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties to marriage and 
divorce records.  The crucial identifying assumption is that conditional on winning more 
than $600 (the threshold at which the names of the winners are recorded) for the first 
time, the amount won is random.  Tests support this identifying assumption: winners of 
$25,000 to $50,000 come from similar neighborhoods as those who win less than $1,000, 
and perhaps more importantly, winners of large sums were no more or less likely to 
marry or divorce before winning the lottery than were (future) winners of small sums.     
The primary advantage of this approach is that it allows us to identify the effect of 
income shocks on marital decisions without assuming that income shocks not predicted 
by observable characteristics are random.  However, this approach does have limitations.  
First, while survey evidence suggests that approximately half of the adults in the US has 
played the state lottery in the previous year, there is an open question regarding the extent 
to which the divorce response of lottery players is representative of the response of the 
general public or of low-income individuals who may be affected by increased income 
supports.  Second, it is possible that individuals may respond differently to the large cash 
transfers observed in our data than they would to smaller cash transfers over a longer 
period of time.  Finally, we cannot address whether income shocks greater than $50,000 
would affect marital decisions, though we note that the size of this prize is nearly one 
year’s income for the average household ($45,300) and twice the per-capita income 
expected of single individuals ($18,500) in our sample.  Despite these limitations, we 
think that our approach will be informative regarding the effect of economic resources on 
marriage and divorce.      
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Results indicate that while large cash transfers do not induce married couples to 
divorce, they do induce singles—particularly women—to remain unmarried.  
Specifically, we find that the divorce rate of married recipients of $25,000 to $50,000 in 
the three years following the income shock is between one-half and one percentage point 
lower that that of recipients of $1,000, which is small both in absolute terms and relative 
to the baseline 3-year divorce rate of 9.5 percent.  Estimates also allow us to rule out 
large absolute positive effects of income shocks on divorce rates: even the upper bound 
of the 95 percent confidence interval implies that fewer than 1 in 50 married couples will 
divorce due to the positive income shock of $25,000 to $50,000.   
However, we also find that single women are nearly 10 percentage points (40 
percent) less likely to marry in the 5 years following the positive income shock.  This 
suggests that while receiving $25,000 to $50,000 may not induce individuals to exit 
marriages, it may at least partially remove the incentive for single women to marry.   
 
2.  Data and Identification Strategy 
To identify the effect of income shocks on marriage and divorce, we exploit the 
variation in income that is caused by the size of lottery prizes in Florida.  Specifically, we 
obtained data on winners from two games: Florida Lotto and Fantasy 5.  Florida Lotto 
allows players to choose 6 numbers or have the computer select a number for them, while 
Fantasy 5 is similar except that there are only 5 numbers.  Both games are pari-mutuel 
games in which the amount won is determined by how many numbers the winner 
matched, the total amount spent on that drawing, and how many players won.  For 
example, while very few Florida Lotto players matched 6 of 6 numbers and won the  
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average prize of $6 million, players who matched 5 of 6 numbers won an average of 
$4,200 though the prizes from some drawings were much larger.   
Similarly, in Fantasy 5 players who matched 5 of 5 numbers prior to 2001 won an 
average of $20,000, though again the actual amount varied widely depending on how 
many players won relative to how many played.  After 2001, players who matched 5 of 5 
numbers won an average of $120,000 while players who matched 4 of 5 numbers when 
no one matched 5 numbers won an average of $900.  Finally, while it is possible for 
individuals to play up to 10 times on each card, an analysis of Fantasy 5 winners revealed 
that no winners had played the same 5 numbers multiple times on the same card.  As a 
result, although some people are more likely to enter our data than others (i.e., those who 
play more frequently or who play multiple times on a card), conditional on winning $600 
the amount won is unaffected by the number of plays paid for on a given card.  Rather, 
the identification strategy that we employ largely relies on the assumption that 
conditional on matching 5 of 6 numbers (Florida Lotto) or 5 of 5 numbers (Fantasy 5) for 
the first time, one’s underlying propensity to marry or divorce is uncorrelated with how 
many winners there were relative to the number of players.  As discussed later, an 
important advantage of this research design is that it is testable.   
The data for the analysis of divorce include every lottery winner in Miami-Dade 
and Palm Beach counties from 1988 through 2004, during which there were 73,714 
individuals who won up to $50,000,
3 while the data for the marriage analysis include only 
Miami-Dade County winners.
4  These winners represent everyone who won at least $600 
                                                 
3 We only examine winners of amounts up to $50,000 because there were relatively few winners of more 
than $50,000.   
4 The data set for the analysis of marriage is smaller because we could not access electronic marriage 
records for Palm Beach County.    
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by playing either Florida Lotto or Fantasy 5,
5 the minimum amount for which records 
were kept.  For each lottery winner, we observe the individual’s name and home zip code, 
the amount won (adjusted for inflation), the date of the drawing, and the lottery game 
played.  Finally, we note that while we do not observe the marital status of lottery players 
at the time of winning, this will not be a problem so long as the magnitude of the cash 
prize is determined randomly.   That is, there should be no more unmarried recipients of 
large cash prizes than there are of small cash prizes.
6  However, as discussed later, the 
fact that not all lottery winners are married or single does change the interpretation of the 
marriage and divorce rates observed as well as the estimated impacts of winning $25,000 
to $50,000.   
Data on marriage and divorce come from the public records in Miami-Dade and 
Palm Beach counties in Florida, which is an equitable distribution state with respect to 
the division of marital assets.
7  These data were linked to the lottery winner data on the 
basis of first and last name and county of residence.  However, before doing so, efforts 
were made to reduce the number of false positive matches made due to common names.  
Toward that end, we excluded all names that appeared more than once in the 2007 county 
phone records.  In addition, if lottery records indicated that an individual with a unique 
name from a given county won more than once, we then use only the first time that 
                                                 
5 The Florida Lottery has other games that we did not use because of insufficient variation in the magnitude 
of the cash prizes won.       
6 To the extent that income shocks affect marriage or divorce decisions in the short term, this may not be 
true in the longer term.  For example, if positive cash shocks induce married couples to divorce, we may 
well expect higher marriage rates (per lottery player) for that group in the longer term as individuals 
remarry.  However, since we only examine divorce rates up to 3 years afterward and find no effect, we are 
less concerned that our marriage estimates would be biased.   
7 This means that in the absence of other considerations such as children, etc., a prize received by one 
spouse should be split equally.  Consistent with this law, we find little differences in the effects based on 
whether the recipient was male or female, which we inferred from the winner’s name using empirical 
probability distributions provided by David Figlio.    
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individual won.
8  Importantly, this also means that our identifying assumption is that 
conditional on winning more than $600 for the first time, the amount won is random.  We 
emphasize this because although whether an individual ever wins a large prize clearly 
depends on frequency of play, the magnitude of the first prize won does not.   
As shown in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix, eliminating individuals with 
common names leaves 32,798 lottery winners for the divorce analysis and 24,797 
winners for the marriage analysis.  The neighborhood (zip code) median family income 
averaged $45,300 for the individuals in the divorce data set, which is approximately the 
same as the median family income of $44,752 for all Miami-Dade and Palm Beach 
county residents.  The winners came from neighborhoods that reported being 42 percent 
of Hispanic origin and 19 percent black.  These lottery winners were then linked to 
divorce (marriage) records filed in their respective county in the 3 (5) years prior to and 
the 3 (5) years after winning.
9  This was performed via an automated search of each 
winner’s first and last name on the Miami-Dade County and Palm Beach County Clerk of 
the Court websites.
10   
The results are shown in Table 1.  Of the 32,798 winners, 1,696 (5.45%) were 
linked to a divorce case within 3 years after winning the lottery.  For the marriage 
analysis, 12.85 percent of recipients were linked to a marriage license in the 5 years after 
winning.  Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, the proportion of divorces appears to be 
                                                 
8 Results are unchanged when these individuals are excluded from the analysis.   
9 Importantly, the indicator used for marriage was the marriage license itself, which is typically obtained no 
more than one week prior to the wedding itself.   
10In the cases where an individual was linked to more than one marriage or divorce in the three years after 
winning (which is true for 7.3% of the individuals matched to at least one divorce after winning the 
lottery), the “average” divorce date was used since it was unclear if the individual divorced more than once 
or if multiple people with the same name divorced.  For example, if one divorce case was filed on January 
1, 2000 and the other was filed on January 1, 2002, that individual was assigned a divorce case filed on 
January 1, 2001.  In addition, similar results were obtained when we used the 1
st divorce case filed after 
winning instead of averaging the divorce dates.    
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approximately constant across winning amounts while the proportion of marriages 
appears to decline as the size of the income shock increases.    
While it is possible that some type I
11 and type II errors were made in linking the 
lottery winners to divorce and marriage filings, neither type of error will invalidate the 
research design due to the randomness of amount won.  That is, we should be no more or 
less likely to match winners of large jackpots to divorce or marriage records than we are 
to match winners of small jackpots, except for the causal effect of the income shock on 
marital decisions.  Consequently, any difference in the marriage or divorce rates of small 
winners and large winners is properly interpreted as the causal effect of receiving a large 
cash prize.   
One way to check our matching algorithm is to compare the divorce rates implied 
by our data to those from the Census.  To do so, it is important to note that not all of the 
income shock recipients are married.  While we know of no measure capturing the 
proportion of lottery players or winners who are married, data from a 1998 nationally 
representative survey of more than 2,400 adults reported by Clotfelter et al. (1999) show 
that lottery participation rates are approximately equal across divorced, married and 
unmarried individuals.
12  Consequently, a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on that 
result and the demographic characteristics of residents of Miami-Dade and Palm Beach 
counties suggest that approximately 54 percent of the individuals in our data were 
                                                 
11 The degree of Type I error likely depends on the prevalence of misspelled names and nicknames in the 
data sets.  In a check of 200 random names from divorces filed in the county and 200 names of unique 
lottery winners, we found 7 potential nicknames in the lottery data and 17 potential nicknames in the 
divorce data.  These names include names such as Jill, Charlie, Danny, Willy, Betty, Fred, and Steve.  
While these names would only be a problem if the individual used one name (e.g., Jill) when filing for 
divorce and another (e.g., Jillian) when claiming lottery winnings, a conservative estimate is that we should 
match 183/200 * 193/200 = 88.3% of individuals who divorce or marry.  We found no obvious 
misspellings among the 400 names, which is not unexpected given the official nature of both data sets.   
12 Specifically, they found that the participation rates among married, single, and divorced individuals were 
49.7%, 52.8%, and 56.7%, respectively.    
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married at the time they won the lottery.
 13   Consequently, the annual divorce rate as a 
proportion of married individuals who received less than $1,000 is (1.82/0.54) 3.37 
percent per year.   By comparison, 2.35% of married Floridians divorced in 2000 
according to Census statistics.   
Finally, an important advantage of our strategy is that we can test the identifying 
assumption that the amount won is uncorrelated with the underlying propensity to marry 
or divorce, conditional on winning at least $600 for the first time.   First, we show that 
the amount won is not explained by the winners’ neighborhood characteristics.  Second, 
we show that marriage and divorce rates prior to winning the lottery are unaffected by 
the amount (later) won.   
 
3.  Methodology 
Given the straightforward nature of this research design, we begin by examining 
whether the average marriage and divorce rates are different for large winners (those who 
win $25,000 – $50,000) than for small winners (those who win between $600 and 
$1,000).
14  For divorce rates, we focus primarily on the rate in the three years after the 
couple receives the income shock since we would expect that any effect on divorce rates 
would be evident relatively quickly.  For marriage rates, we examine a longer time frame 
of 5 years to allow recipients time for increased dating, etc., after winning the cash prize.       
                                                 
13 According to the 2000 Census data for Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties, 54.27 percent of residents 
over the age of 18 were married.  Assuming equal participation rates by marital group as roughly found by 
Clotfelter et al (1999), this means that one could expect that 54.27% of lottery winners would be married.   
14 While we would ideally be able to examine the effect of winning even larger amounts than $25,000 - 
$50,000, we note that this amount is large relative to the average household income of $44,752.  
Consequently, it seems reasonable that if higher income causes a net “independence” effect due to relaxed 
liquidity constraints or the ability to afford two households for a period of time, we would be able to 
observe that effect in our sample.    
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Our primary test of whether income shocks cause individuals to marry or divorce is 
to estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares regression, though similar 
marginal effect estimates result from using a probit:
15  
(1) Outcomei = β0 + β1 ($1k-$10k Winner)i + β2 ($10k-$25k Winner)i  
+ β3 ($25k-$50k Winner)i + β4 (Fantasy 5)i+ Φyear +  θzip code + εi 
Where Outcomei is an indicator variable equal to 1 if lottery player i divorced 
(married) within a given number of years after winning the lottery, ($25k-$50k Winner) is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual won between $25,000 and $50,000, 
(Fantasy 5) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual won by playing Fantasy 5 
(where Florida Lotto is the excluded game), and θ is a vector of zip code fixed effects.  
The primary coefficients of interest are β2 and β3, the sign of which indicates whether 
receiving large positive income shocks induces individuals to be more or less likely to 
marry or divorce.   
 
4.  Results 
4.1  Tests of the Identification Strategy 
To demonstrate that the size of the income shock received is uncorrelated with 
other determinants of marriage and divorce, we offer two tests.  First, in results available 
upon request, we regress the cash prize on 13 neighborhood demographic characteristics 
measuring income, gender, marital status, and educational attainment (as well as 
interactions) and find that only one coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
                                                 
15 Probit estimates are available upon request.  Although probit or logit can be preferable to ordinary least 
squares when most values are near zero or one, there are also disadvantages that one might expect to be 
especially worrisome in this context.  For example, omitted variables can cause bias in probit or logit 
estimations even if they are orthogonal to the treatment variable.  In addition, even classical measurement 
error in the dependent variable can result in inconsistent estimates (Hausman, 2001; Hausman et al, 1998).    
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level.
16  More importantly, all of the variables collectively explain only 0.1 percent of the 
variation in lottery winnings for individuals in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties.   
Second, we match lottery winners to marriage and divorce records filed in the years 
before the individual won the lottery.  In the absence of correlation between amount won 
and underlying propensity to marry or divorce, we would expect no difference between 
the marriage and divorce rates of individuals who would later win a large cash prize 
compared to those of individuals who would later win a small cash prize.   The estimated 
impacts of winning $10,000 to $25,000 and $25,000 to $50,000 relative to winning less 
than $1,000 are reported in Table A3 in the appendix.  As expected, the amount won does 
not affect the probability of filing for divorce or getting married, consistent with the 
identifying assumption.   
4.2  The Effect of Positive Income Shocks on Divorce 
We now turn to the effect of income shocks on divorce.  We begin by examining 
whether flows into divorce for small winners (those who won less than $1,000) are 
different from large winners (those who won between $25,000 and $50,000) before and 
after winning.  Results are shown in Figure 1a, which shows that there is little difference 
between the divorce rates of these two groups before or after the income shocks.  This 
result is corroborated by Figure 1b, which shows residual divorce rates after removing 
year and game fixed effects.  
To formally test for differences in the divorce rates of the two groups in the 3 
years after winning, we estimate equation (1) from above.  Results are shown in Table 2, 
which shows that the raw difference between winning $25,000 to $50,000 and winning 
                                                 
16 The significant variable was the proportion of women from the county, the coefficient of which implies 
that a 5 percentage point increase in the proportion of women is associated with a prize that is $325 larger.  
We note that this is small relative to the amounts examined in this paper.    
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less than $1,000 is -0.38 percentage points, which is relative to a baseline divorce rate of 
5.1 percent.  Including controls for game, year, and player zip code changes the estimate 
only slightly to 0.11 percentage points.  Neither estimate is statistically significant.     
Because not all lottery players were married at the time of the income shock, the 
estimates must be reweighted in order to interpret the estimates as divorce rates relative 
to the married population.  According to data from a nationally representative survey 
reported by Clotfelter et al. (1999) and Miami-Dade and Palm Beach county 
demographics, we estimate that 54 percent of lottery winners were married at the time 
they won.  Consequently, the 5.1 percent baseline divorce rate in the lottery winner 
population over the three years after winning corresponds to a (5.12/0.54) 9.48 percent 
actual divorce rate among married individuals.  Similarly, the -0.38 percentage point 
difference implies a statistically insignificant 0.70 percentage point drop in the divorce 
rate due to winning $25,000 - $50,000.  Importantly, while the estimates are not 
statistically different from zero, they are reasonably precise.  The upper bound of the 95% 
confidence interval suggests that no more than 1 in 50 married couples will be induced to 
divorce as a result of receiving a large income shock.
17  This implies that to the extent life 
events or policy changes affect divorce, it is unlikely due to a pure positive income 
shock.   
To ensure that the results are not driven by the admittedly arbitrary cutoffs made in 
defining large and small income shocks, divorce rates for the full range of income shocks 
are shown in Figure 2.  Consistent with the estimates in Table 2, there appears to be no 
                                                 
17 The reweighted point estimate is -0.0070, while the reweighted standard error is 0.0068/0.54 = 0.0126.  
Consequently, the upper bound for the 95% confidence interval is -0.0070 + 1.96*0.0126 = 0.0177.  In 
absolute terms, this implies that fewer than 1 in 50 married couples will divorce as a result of receiving the 
income shock, while in relative terms it implies that there will be no more than a 19% (0.0177/0.0948) 
increase in the divorce rate among married lottery players.    
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relationship between the magnitude of the income shock and the likelihood of 
subsequently filing for divorce.  In results available upon request, we also find no 
difference between winners coming from minority- or majority-Hispanic zip codes, 
above or below median income zip codes, or between male and female winners.
18  
Finally, using probit to estimate the model rather than OLS yielded similar estimates.
19  
4.3  The Effect of Positive Income Shocks on Marriage 
We now turn to the question of whether large positive income shocks affect an 
individual’s likelihood of getting married.  Flows into marriage are shown in Figure 2a 
and indicate that consistent with the identifying assumption, there is little difference in 
the marriage rates prior to the income shock.  Figure 2b, which shows residual marriage 
rates after partialing out year and game fixed effects, also provides no evidence that flows 
into marriage were different prior to the income shock.   
After the $25,000 to $50,000 income shock, both Figures 2a and 2b reveal a small 
if not definitive reduction in marriage rates in the 5 years afterward.  Results from more 
formal tests of the effect of winning $25,000 to $50,000 on marriage rates within 3 and 5 
years are shown in Table 2.  The raw difference in 5-year marriage rates is -1.36 
percentage points, while the difference after controlling for game and year fixed effects is 
-2.16 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  Both are 
relative to a baseline marriage rate among lottery players of 14.17 percent.   
                                                 
18 Gender was inferred on the basis of first names using empirical probability distributions provided by 
David Figlio.   
19 For example, results from a probit estimation that include game and year fixed effects imply that winning 
$25,000 to $50,000 causes divorce rates over the next 3 years to increase by a statistically insignificant 0.11 
percentage points, compared to 0.07 percentage points from the OLS regression.  Similarly, the effect on 
marriage in the 5 years after winning is -1.64 percentage points compared to an OLS estimate of -2.16 
percentage points, both of which are significant at the 10% level.    
15  15 
As with divorce, before interpreting these estimates one must remember that 
approximately only 46% of winners were unmarried.  Consequently, the estimates 
suggest that (14.17/0.46) 30.8 percent of single individuals married in the 5 years after 
winning the lottery.  Similarly, the absolute reduction in marriage rates implied by the 
estimate in Specification 2 of Table 2 is -2.16/0.46 = -4.7 percentage points, or 15 
percent.  This implies that approximately 1 in 20 single individuals are induced not to 
marry as a result of receiving a large positive income shock.  This relationship can also 
be seen in Figure 4, which shows a modest negative relationship between the size of the 
income shock and marriage rates.   
To further investigate this result, we examine whether women respond differently 
than men.
20  To do so, we used empirical distributions on the gender of first names from 
David Figlio to categorize each winner as either male or female and were able to do so 
for 20,136 of the 24,797 individuals in the marriage data set.  The results are shown 
graphically in Figure 5, while the regression estimates are shown in Table 3.  Both 
indicate that while positive income shocks do not affect men’s marriage rates, women 
who receive $25,000 to $50,000 are significantly less likely to marry than women who 
receive less than $1,000.  For example, point estimates in Specification 2 of Table 3 
indicate that women who receive the positive income shock are 4.4 percentage points less 
likely to marry in the next five years than their counterparts who received less than 
$1,000.  This is a large effect given that only 10.6 percent of all female lottery players 
married in the following 5 years.  Furthermore, once one accounts for the fact that not all 
of the cash prize recipients are single, the estimates in Table 4 imply that the five year 
                                                 
20 We also investigate differences by income and race as proxied by the demographics of each winner’s zip 
code and found no differences.    
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marriage rate among single women falls by nearly 10 percentage points (or 40 percent) as 
a result of the income shock.  This is consistent with the interpretation that large positive 
income shocks remove some of the incentive to marry, though it is also possible that the 
additional income makes single life more attractive in other ways.     
4.4  Migration Out of the County of Residence 
The identification strategy utilized in this paper will break down if large income 
shocks cause individuals to move to another county before marrying or divorcing.
21  We 
expect this to be unlikely for several reasons.  First, residents of Miami-Dade and Palm 
Beach counties appear to have strong roots: the Census reports that over 80 percent of 
residents in these counties lived in the same county 5 years earlier, a number which 
would likely be higher if not for substantial migration into the area over this time period.  
Second, both Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties are very large and offer a diverse set 
of areas in which one could relocate without leaving the county.  Geographically, Miami-
Dade and Palm Beach counties cover 1,946 and 1,974 square miles, respectively, making 
each of them over six times the size of New York City and over one-third as large as the 
state of Connecticut.  Both are also large in terms of population; Miami-Dade County 
was home to 2.3 million people in 2000 while 1.1 million people resided in Palm Beach 
County.  Furthermore, there is substantial within-county variation in neighborhoods in 
both counties.  For example, the median family income in the poorest zip code in Miami-
Dade County was $18,000 while the median family income in the wealthiest zip code 
                                                 
21 We should point out that the potential for bias is smaller here than it might otherwise be due to how the 
sample was constructed.  Specifically, because all individuals are assumed to not divorce (marry) unless 
matched to a divorce (marriage) record, the results are unaffected if large income shocks cause differential 
attrition only among individuals who will not later divorce (marry).    
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was $200,000.  Collectively, these factors minimize the likelihood that a wealth shock 
will cause individuals to move out of the county.   
We can offer one test of whether differential migration out of the county is likely 
to be a problem for our analysis.  Specifically, we link individuals who won the lottery 
between March of 2003 and March of 2007 to phone records accessed in March of 
2008.
22  Results are reported in Table 5, which show that the difference in the proportions 
of small and big winners showing up in the county phone records one to five years later is 
small and statistically insignificant.  While this is an imperfect test due to the fact that 
some households no longer have landlines, some individuals who do are not listed in the 
phone book, and winning the lottery could enable some families to afford a landline, it 
does provide some comfort that differential migration from the county is unlikely to bias 
the results.
 23       
 
5.  Conclusions 
While economists have long been interested in the relationship between economic 
resources and marital decisions, determining the extent to which economic resources 
affect marriage and divorce has been difficult due to a lack of exogenous income shocks.  
To overcome that problem, we exploit income shocks that occur as a result of winning 
the lottery and compare the marriage and divorce rates of individuals who won between 
$25,000 and $50,000 to those who won just over $600.  We find no evidence that pure 
income shocks cause statistically significant or economically meaningful changes in 
                                                 
22 Note that these individuals were not used in the main analysis.  We are unable to use this test on the main 
sample of lottery winners because we do not have access to historical phone records.   
23 These factors are likely the reason why the number of individuals linked to phone records after winning 
is lower than one would otherwise expect.  This is reflected by the fact only 53 percent of winners of less 
than $1,000 are found in the phone records in the 6 months after winning.     
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divorce rates.  Moreover, even the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval 
implies that fewer than 1 in 50 married couples will be induced to divorce as a result of 
receiving an income shock that is approximately twice as large as per-capita income.   
However, we do find evidence that positive income shocks reduce marriage rates in 
the following five years.  Women are most affected; point estimates suggest that nearly 1 
in 10 single women will be induced not to marry as a result of the income shock, a 40 
percent decline.  Consequently, while the results presented in this study indicate that 
additional resources do not induce individuals to exit their existing marriages, they do 
suggest that additional income may induce single women to remain unmarried.   
19  19 
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Table 1: Lottery Winners Linked to Marriage and Divorce Records after Winning 








<$1,000 2,538 130 5.12 1799 255 14.17
$1,000 - $5,000 16,517 908 5.50 11545 1517 13.14
$5,000 - $10,000 7,720 435 5.63 5114 622 12.16
$10,000 - $15,000 1,008 47 4.66 728 81 11.13
$15,000 - $25,000 1,583 91 5.75 1348 170 12.61
$25,000 - $35,000 1,164 62 5.33 962 129 13.41
$35,000 - $50,000 572 23 4.02 478 49 10.25
Total 31,102 1,696 5.45 21,974 2,823 12.85
Within 3 Years of Winning Within 5 Years of Winning 
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Table 2: The Effect of Receiving Up to $50,000 on Marriage and Divorce (relative to receiving less than $1,000) 
Specification
Panel 1: The Effect of Random Income Shocks on Divorce Rates
$10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000
Within 3 Years 0.0029 -0.0038 0.0027 0.0007 0.0030 0.0011
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0064) (0.0074)
Observations
$10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000
Within 3 Years -0.0079 -0.0086 -0.0095 -0.0127 -0.0158 -0.0136
(0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0106)
Within 5 Years -0.0158 -0.0136 -0.0187* -0.0216* -0.0176* -0.0211*






Estimates are in percentage points and are relative to receiving less than $1,000.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates are relative to a 3-year 
divorce rate of 5.12% and 3-year and 5-year marriage rates of 8.19% and 14.17%, respectively.  
24,797 24,797 24,797
(2) (3)
Panel 2: The Effect of Random Income Shocks on Marriage Rates
No
32,798 32,798 32,798
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Table 3: The Effect of Receiving $25,000 to $50,000 on 5-Year Marriage Rates for Men 
and Women 
Specification 1 2
Effect on Women -0.0382** -0.0443**
(0.0173) (0.0181)
Effect on Men -0.0027 -0.0090
(0.0167) (0.0176)
Observations 20,136 20,136
Includes Game and 
Year Fixed Effects?
No Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates are relative to winning 
less than $1,000 and compare to 5-year marriage rates of 10.6% for women and 
15.0% for men in that group.  Asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
 
 
Table 4: The Proportion of Lottery Winners Who Are Linked to County Phone Records 
One to Five Years Later 
Winners of Less than $1,000 Winners of More than $25,000 Difference





Standard errors are in parentheses.  
None of the differences are statistically different at conventional levels.  
1 to 3 Years Later
3 to 5 Years Later 
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Figure 1a: Flows into Divorce before and after Receiving Small and Large Cash Prizes 
 
Figure 1b: Flows into Divorce before and after Receiving Small and Large Cash Prizes 
(after Removing Year and Game Fixed Effects) 
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Figure 3a: Flows into Marriage before and after Receiving Small and Large Cash Prizes 
 
Figure 3b: Flows into Marriage before and after Receiving Small and Large Cash Prizes 
(after Removing Game and Year Fixed Effects) 
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Figure 4: Marriage Rates in the 5 Years after Winning the Lottery  
 
Figure 5: Marriage Rates for Men and Women in the 5 Years after Winning the Lottery  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Constructing the Sample of Unique Lottery Winners in Miami-Dade and Palm 
Beach Counties Used for Divorce Analysis 
Amount Won Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
<$1,000 7,713 10.46 3,817 8.14 2,668 8.13
$1,000 - $5,000 39,151 53.11 24,740 52.75 17,425 53.13
$5,000 - $10,000 16,447 22.31 11,701 24.95 8,155 24.86
$10,000 - $15,000 2,130 2.89 1,576 3.36 1,055 3.22
$15,000 - $25,000 3,888 5.27 2,398 5.11 1,674 5.10
$25,000 - $35,000 2,938 3.99 1,788 3.81 1,226 3.74
$35,000 - $50,000 1,447 1.96 881 1.88 595 1.81
Total 73,714 100.00 46,901 100.00 32,798 100.00





Table A2: Constructing the Sample of Unique Lottery Winners in Miami-Dade County 
Used for Marriage Analysis 
Amount Won Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
<$1,000 4,559 9.33 3,134 8.35 2,054 8.28
$1,000 - $5,000 25,813 52.84 19,695 52.45 13,062 52.68
$5,000 - $10,000 10,535 21.57 8,662 23.07 5,736 23.13
$10,000 - $15,000 1,560 3.19 1,287 3.43 809 3.26
$15,000 - $25,000 3,024 6.19 2,290 6.10 1,518 6.12
$25,000 - $35,000 2,282 4.67 1,684 4.49 1,091 4.40
$35,000 - $50,000 1,074 2.20 795 2.12 527 2.13
Total 48,847 100.00 37,547 100.00 24,797 100.00
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Table A3: Falsification Test: The Impact of (Later) Winning the Lottery on Marriage and Divorce Rates Prior to Winning 
Specification
Panel 1: The Effect of Future Random Income Shocks on Divorce Rates
$10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000
Within 3 Years -0.0015 -0.0080 0.0007 -0.0051 0.0005 -0.0051
(0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0061) (0.0070)
Observations
$10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $10,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000
Within 3 Years 0.0052 -0.0071 0.0002 -0.0152 0.0009 -0.0145
(0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0098)
Within 5 Years 0.0121 0.0026 0.0099 -0.0048 0.0112 -0.0036
(0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0106) (0.0119)
Observations
Estimates are in percentage points and are relative to receiving less than $1,000.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates are relative to a 3-year 




Includes Game and 
Year Fixed Effects?
No Yes Yes
Panel 2: The Effect of Future Random Income Shocks on Marriage Rates
24,797 24,797 24,797
(1) (2) (3)
32,798 32,798 32,798
 